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Abstract
Device-to-Device (D2D) communication is offering smart phone users a choice to share files with
each other without communicating with the cellular network. In this paper, we discuss the behaviors
of two characters in the D2D data transaction model from an economic point of view: the data buyers
who wish to buy a certain quantity of data, as well as the data sellers who wish to sell data through the
D2D network. The optimal price and purchasing strategies are analyzed and deduced based on game
theory.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Device-to-Device (D2D) communication has been proposed as a revolutionary paradigm to
enhance the capacity of cellular networks [1]. According to D2D theory, a cell area under
the control of one base station is divided into several clusters, and mobile users in the same
cluster are close enough to establish direct connections. This clustering concept can remarkably
improve the performance of cellular networks, and several aspects of the benefits have been
investigated [2], including higher spectral efficiency, enhanced total throughput, higher energy
efficiency and shorter delay.
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2Since multimedia files, like wireless videos, have been the main driver for the inexorable
increase in data transmission, experts have proposed many methods to deal with the problem. In
retrospect, researchers proposed methods like: decreasing the cell size to improve the spectral
efficiency, using additional spectrum and improving the physical-layer link capacity, but all these
traditional methods are not satisfactory and may even bring other problems. Later, it was observed
that mobile devices have large storage space. Following this idea, a novel architecture based on
D2D communication was thoroughly analyzed in [3].
In this paper, we explore the mobile users’ behaviors when they buy or sell videos within a
D2D cluster in terms of an economic point of view. We model the file distribution as a competition
mechanism against the data service of base station, and thus the autonomous D2D mechanism
is preferred, where the data transaction is managed by D2D users without manipulation of base
station. Furthermore, in order to analyze the optimal selling and purchasing strategies of the
users, we use game theory to model different situations. Specifically, we model the one buyer
multiple sellers case as a Stackelburg game, and model the one seller multiple buyers case as
an auction game. The ultimate goal is to maximize the utility of both sides simultaneously.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In the formulation of the channel condition, we assume that in a certain cluster Ci, a data
buyer Bi purchases files from a data seller Si with total transmission power Gi. Moreover, the
distance between Bi and Si is represented by di, and Dij denotes the distance between two
neighbor D2D clusters’ centers. Also, we assume that the channel gain is Hi, as well as σ
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represents the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) power. Considering M neighbor D2D
clusters in a cellular network, the cluster interference power of neighbor cluster Cj is denoted as
GI,j with the corresponding channel gain HI,j , j = 1, . . . ,M . For Ci, the Signal to Interference
plus Noise Ratio (SINR) is given by:
SINR =
GiHi/
√
di
σ2 +
M∑
j=1
(GI,jHI,j/
√
Dij)
. (1)
The total channel bandwidth available for data transactions can be deemed as W . Then, relying
on Shannon formula, the maximal achievable bit rate between Bi and Si follows:
Ri = W log2

1 + GiHi/
√
di
σ2 +
M∑
j=1
(GI,jHI,j/
√
Dij)

 . (2)
3The total nodal delay is calculated as the sum of processing, queuing, transmission and
propagation time. Relying on the delay model in [4], which approximatively maps the network
architecture into bi-directional graphs, the system delay can be denoted as:
D(Y, V ) = β(O)
√
Y + V√
log (Y + V )
ms, (3)
where the Y represents the number of users (buyers and sellers) in a data transaction model,
while V denotes the number of other users in the same cellular network who are simultaneously
transmitting data. Furthermore, β(O) is a function of the size of transaction data O.
III. TRANSACTION MODEL
In this section, we will discuss the data transaction problem in two different situations. The
first situation consists of one data buyer purchasing from several data sellers, where the buyer
can purchase different coding layers of a video from different sellers and combine these streams
during the decoding process [5]. The second model consists of one seller selling data to multiple
buyers. The major difference between the two models is whether the buyer or the seller takes
the first move in the game.
A. Initiating with the Buyer
In this subsection, we consider the transaction model of one data buyer B purchasing multi-
media files from N data sellers, namely, {S1, . . . , SN} in D2D cluster Ci. Then, the SINR and
the bit rate between B and Sn can be calculated by Eq. (1) and Eq. (2). Given the the total
available bandwidth W , which will be evenly allocated to all users. The maximal achievable bit
rate of the buyer is given by:
RB =
W
N + 1
N∑
n=1
log2

1 + GnHn/
√
dn
σ2 +
M∑
j=1
(GI,jHI,j/
√
Dij)

 . (4)
Due to transmission delay, the strategies of the buyer and the sellers would be announced
sequentially, which is beneficial of constructing a Stackelburg game model [6], where a data
buyer takes the first step to send a detect signal, in order to inform other mobile users in the
same cluster what particular video file he/she wants. Next, the potential sellers send back their
prices along with the channel conditions. Then, the data buyer decides how much the transmission
power he/she intends to buy from different sellers, respectively.
4A data buyer can choose to buy from part of the sellers or all the sellers, and even he/she is
capable of selecting service providers, if that way can lead to a higher reward.
1) Caching Conditions: Whether a seller has stored a copy of the file or not can affect his/her
reward considerably, because this determines whether the seller needs to download the file from
service provider before transmitting it to the buyer.
In [7], Zipf distribution has been verified as a good model to measure the popularity of a set
of video files. Thus, we assume that there are totally K popular videos in this region within
a month, and the popularity of the videos is subject to Zipf distribution with the parameter η.
Then, the required frequency of the ith popular video file can be denoted as:
λi =
1/iη∑K
k=1 1/k
η
, 1 ≤ i ≤ K. (5)
Meanwhile, we assume that the caching of the files are uniformly distributed among the users,
which means that for every internal storage unit of a seller’s device, the probability that it is
used to store one of the K files is 1/K.
Given that a seller can store τ different popular video files of this month in his/her internal
storage, there are CτK possible different storage modes. Furthermore, we denote one of the
possible storage mode of the seller as Γ = {Γ1, . . . ,Γτ}, where Γi, i = 1, . . . , τ , represents the
rank order among K popular video files. Thus, the possibility of one of CτK storage modes can
be given by:
Pr(Γ) =
τ !(K − τ)!
K!
, (6)
and the probability of this seller having a cached copy of the wanted file in terms of the Γ
storage mode follows:
Pr(wanted|Γ) =
τ∑
i=1
λΓi . (7)
Relying on the total probability formula, the probability that a seller has a cached copy of the
wanted file can be constructed as:
Pr(Cache) =
∑
Γ
[Pr(wanted|Γ) · Pr(Γ)] . (8)
2) Reward Functions: The data buyer B in cluster Ci gains reward by successfully receiving
the file with a good quality measured by the maximal achievable transmission rate. Specifically,
5B has to pay the price pn(1 ≤ n ≤ N) for a unit of transmission power of N sellers, respectively.
Therefore, the data buyer’s reward function can be formulated as:
ΦB=
W
N + 1
N∑
n=1
log2

1+ GnHn/
√
dn
σ2 +
M∑
j=1
(GI,jHI,j/
√
Dij)

 · ξR
−D(Y, V ) · ξD −
N∑
n=1
pn ·Gn,
(9)
where the coefficient ξR represents the unit reward in terms of the maximal achievable bit rate,
as well as ξD denotes the unit loss measured by the system transmission delayed, which can be
deemed as normalizing weight parameters for both RB and D(Y, V ). Gn represents the traded
transmission power that the seller Sn transmits to B. The system delay D(Y, V ) is defined in
Eq. (3).
In the following, we formulate the sellers’ reward function. We introduce parameters cn,
n = 1, . . . , N , to represent the unit cost for relaying data between B and Sn, which is determined
by the characteristics of the sellers’ devices. Thus, the utility function of Sn can be defined as:
ΦSn = Pr(Cache) · (pn − cn) ·Gn+
[1− Pr(Cache)] · (pn − cn − s) ·Gn,
(10)
where s is the unit cost of downloading files from the nearest base station. Additionally, we has
a maximum cellular users constraint, i.e., Y + V ≤ Ω.
3) Optimal Strategies: In a Stackelburg game, the optimal transaction strategies for both
sides exist and can be obtained using backward induction. The last move is for the data buyer
to determine the optimal transmission power Gn acquired from seller Sn to maximize his/her
reward ΦB . Moreover, we assume that the possible power of a received video is continuous [8].
Hence, we can obtain Gn by letting the first-order derivative of ΦB with respect to Gn be
zero, which leads to
Gn =
WξR
(N + 1)pn ln 2
−
√
dn
[
σ2 +
M∑
j=1
(
GI,jHI,j/
√
Dij
)]
Hn
. (11)
As the second last move, the sellers need to decide the optimal price pn in terms of the
transmission power Gn purchased by the buyer. We substitute Gn in Eq. (10) with Eq. (11), and
6let the first-order derivative with respect to pn equal zero, we have the optimal price of the data
seller Sn:
pn =
√√√√√√
WHnξR[cn + s(1− Pr(Cache))]
(N + 1)
√
dn
[
σ2 +
M∑
j=1
(
GI,jHI,j/
√
Dij
)]
ln 2
. (12)
Substituting pn in Eq. (11) with Eq. (12), we can achieve the optimal transmission power Gn.
B. Initiating with the Seller
In this situation, if a seller wants to sell data to nearby users, he/she takes the first step to
send a probe signal to announce the availability of stored data resources. The seller would prefer
to maximize his/her reward by transmitting popular video files in terms of a fierce competition
among the potential multiple data buyers.
We model this decentralized process as alternative ascending clock auction (ACA-A) game,
because it guarantees an efficient and cheat-proof allocation [9]. In our model, there are N
buyers, namely Bn, n = 1, . . . , N , competing for high quality data from one seller S.
Similarly, the SINR and maximal achievable bit rate are given by Eq. (1) and Eq. (2). Then,
the reward function of the buyers at clock step t can be deemed as:
ΦtBn(p
0, Gn) = R
t
Bn
· ξR −D(Y, V )t · ξD − pt ·Gtn, (13)
where, pt represents the price of unit transmission power charged by S. Suppose that the seller
wants to sell total power of G. In the beginning of the auction, S sets up the clock index t = 0,
regulates time-step size δ > 0, and announces the initial price p0 to all the D2D users in the
cluster Ci. Then, each potential buyer Bn offers his/her optimal bid G
0
n by computing
G0n = argmax
Gn
ΦBn
(
p0, Gn
)
. (14)
Then, the seller sums up all the bids G0total =
∑
nG
0
n, and compares G
0
total with G. If G
0
total ≤ G,
the seller concludes the auction. Otherwise, the seller sets pt+1 = pt+δ, t = t+1 and announces
the price pt to all the buyers who bid for the next time. Thus, each buyer offers his/her optimal
bid Gt+1n by calculating
Gt+1n = argmax
Gn
ΦBn
(
pt+1, Gn
)
. (15)
7After collecting all the bids, the seller computes the total bid Gt+1total. The seller continues the
auction until Gt+1total ≤ G. At every clock t, the seller computes the cumulative clinch χtn, which
is the amount of data that the buyer Bn is guaranteed to win at clock t:
χtn = max
(
0, G−
∑
j 6=n
Gtj
)
, (16)
and the buyer will purchase this χtn quantity of power with price p
t. This has been proved to be
a cheat-proof scheme.
Let the final clock index be T . As the price p increases discretely, we may have GTtotal < G,
in which case the power resource is not fully utilized. We adopt a proportional rationing scheme
in order to make sure that GTtotal = G [10]. Therefore, the final allocated transmission power
can be denoted by:
Gn,final = G
T
n +
GT−1n −GTn
N∑
i=1
GT−1i −
N∑
i=1
GTi
(
G−
N∑
i=1
GTi
)
, (17)
which satisfy
∑
nGn,final = G.
We set χTn = Gn,final, and the total payment of buyer Bn is given by:
Pn = χ
0
np
0 +
T∑
t=1
pt
(
χtn − χt−1n
)
. (18)
In this model, the reward of the seller can be formulated as:
ΦS =
N∑
n=1
(Pn − cnGn,final), (19)
where cn accounts for the unit transmission cost.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we will show the variation tendency of the sellers’ and buyers’ reward functions
and their optimal choices in different models.
A. Initiating with the Buyer
In our simulation, we set the data buyer at the origin (0,0) and let other mobile users uniformly
distribute in a cell. The radius of a cell is 500m, as well as the radius of a D2D cluster is set
as 100m. Potential sellers, i.e., N = 10, are uniformly distributed in a D2D cluster. Besides, the
number of clusters, which are randomly scattered in a cell, is M = 10. We set the noise power
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Fig. 1. Variation tendency of the reward functions for the buyer and sellers versus the increasing sellers’ number.
The Number of Sellers
2 4 6 8
100
120
140
160
180
200
220
240
260
280
Total Traded Transmission Power 
Pr(Cache)=0.3
Pr(Cache)=0.4
Pr(Cache)=0.5
The Number of Sellers
2 4 6 8
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
30
32
Average Price
Pr(Cache)=0.3
Pr(Cache)=0.4
Pr(Cache)=0.5
Fig. 2. Variation tendency of the optimal choices of the buyer and sellers versus the increasing sellers’ number.
spectrum density to be −174dBm, and the total available bandwidth for D2D data transaction
is 5MHz under an ideal channel gain H = 1. Moreover, for all users, the maximal transmit
power is 100mW, i.e., Gn ≤ 100mW, GI,j ≤ 100mW, and the normalized weighting parameters
ξR = 3 × 10−5/bps as well as ξD = 10−1/ms in terms of β(O) = 20 under the assumption of
the same packet size O = 1MB. The data seller’s unit transmission power cost c is uniformly
distributed in [0.1, 0.5]/mW. Finally, we set the probability that the seller has stored a copy of
the wanted file to be Pr(Cache) = 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, respectively.
From Fig. 1 and Fig. 2, we can conclude that as the number of potential sellers increases,
the average price of sellers decreases, while the total traded transmission power improves.
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Fig. 3. Variation tendency of the seller’s reward function and the total rounds of the auction with respect to the number of
buyers.
Furthermore, the data buyer’s reward increases at the beginning, and then keeps constant. That
is because when there are more sellers, they may compete with each other and lower the price.
However, when the buyer purchase from superfluous buyers, system delay start to play a critical
role in reducing the rewards. Also, with the improving of the probability of having a wanted
cached video copy, the sellers tend to lower their prices, which contributes to higher rewards.
B. Initiating with the Seller
The seller’s price is set to be 5 at the first clock step, as well as the total available transmission
power of the seller is G = 100mW. Other simulation parameters are the same as above. The
variation tendency of the seller’s reward is shown in Fig. 3 in terms of different number of
buyers.
With less than 3 buyers, the transaction is finished in the first round and the seller choose to
utilize the data resource him/herself. However, given more buyers, the seller allocates the power
resources relying on the ACA-A auction scheme. As the number of buyers increases, the auction
takes more rounds, as well as the traded price tends to be higher, which leads to higher rewards
of the seller.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we established two data transaction models in D2D communication networks.
A Stackelburg game as well as an ACA-A auction model were proposed for one-buyer/multiple-
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seller situation and one-seller/multiple-buyers situation, respectively. Moreover, theocratical anal-
ysis and numerical simulations were conducted in order both to achieve optimal trading strategies
and to provide a new research method for D2D users’ behavior.
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